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Abstract
Adversarial training (AT) aims to improve the robustness
of deep learning models by mixing clean data and adver-
sarial examples (AEs). Most existing AT approaches can be
grouped into restricted and unrestricted approaches. Re-
stricted AT requires a prescribed uniform budget to con-
strain the magnitude of the AE perturbations during train-
ing, with the obtained results showing high sensitivity to the
budget. On the other hand, unrestricted AT uses uncon-
strained AEs, resulting in the use of AEs located beyond the
decision boundary; these overestimated AEs significantly
lower the accuracy on clean data. These limitations mean
that the existing AT approaches have difficulty in obtaining
a comprehensively robust model with high accuracy and ro-
bustness when confronting attacks with varying strengths.
Considering this problem, this paper proposes a novel AT
approach named blind adversarial training (BAT) to bet-
ter balance the accuracy and robustness. The main idea
of this approach is to use a cutoff-scale strategy to adap-
tively estimate a nonuniform budget to modify the AEs used
in the training, ensuring that the strengths of the AEs are
dynamically located in a reasonable range and ultimately
improving the overall robustness of the AT model. The ex-
perimental results obtained using BAT for training classifi-
cation models on several benchmarks demonstrate the com-
petitive performance of this method.
1. Introduction
Deep learning [14, 5] has made great breakthroughs in
many fields, such as computer vision [12], speech recogni-
tion [17, 8], and natural language processing [27]. However,
∗Corresponding author: xiangxueshuang@qxslab.cn
Easily Attacked Easily Attacked
(a) Normal Training (b) Adversarial Training
with budget 0.1
(c) Blind Adversarial Training
with Adversarial Accuracy
Robustness
Figure 1. Comparison of different training approaches employing
the two circles classification problem with the 1-hidden-layer 6-
dim perceptron. We show the results of AT with a budget of 0.1.
The solid blue/red lines correspond to the datasets of two labels,
the solid gray lines represent the decision boundary of the classi-
fiers, and the blue/red shadow zones in (b,c) show the manifold of
AEs.
after adversarial examples (AEs) were introduced [29, 7],
the weakness of deep neural networks has attracted increas-
ingly more attention. Many effective AE generation meth-
ods and defensive strategies are proposed; see the review
papers and references therein for details [2, 33].
Adversarial training (AT) is a process of training a
neural network on a mixture of clean data and AEs in
order to improve the robustness of the network against
adversarial attacks; see [29, 7, 16] for white-box attacks
and [13, 30, 26] for black-box attacks. These approaches
focus on improving the generalization ability of AT by mod-
ifying the AE generation method or training loss. However,
the AEs perturbations during training is the main problem
in this approach. Most existing AT approaches can be di-
vided into two categories, restricted and unrestricted AT.
For both of the approaches, it was proved numerically [16]
and theoretically [31] that an improvement in the robustness
is always accompanied by a loss of accuracy. Furthermore,
the limitation of incurring a minimal impact on accuracy
requires the architecture of the network to be sufficiently
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Figure 2. Comparison of the accuracy against attacks with varying budgets (x-axis) of the AT models (FGSM-AT/PGD-AT) with varying
budgets (the lines as the legend) on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. For more results, see Appendix C.
expressive [2, 33], as guaranteed by the universal approx-
imation theorem [7, 9] and regularization [25]; even so, it
is still difficult to achieve improved robustness [7, 30, 22].
Therefore, we first analyze the characteristics of existing AT
approaches.
The restricted AT approaches use norm-constrained AEs,
such as FGSM-AT [7] and PGD-AT [16] with using FGSM
and PGD AEs respectively, require a prescribed uniform
budget to constrain the magnitude of the AE perturbation
during training and then evaluate the result on the AEs
with the same budget. The model obtained with the pre-
scribed budget is only robust when confronting the attack
with the same strength, while it is clearly weak for an attack
stronger than the prescribed budget, and is overly defen-
sive when confronting a small attack or encountering clean
data. Madry et al. [16] found that a large budget is neces-
sary to improve the AT effectiveness, but possibly lowering
the accuracy on clean data, this result was also verified nu-
merically by Song et al. [26]. We analyze this issue using
a synthetic problem, namely, the two circles classification
(TCC) problem [1]. As shown in Figure 1 (a), a classifier
employing normal training (NT) can be trained with an ac-
curacy of 100% but easily attacked. For AT with a bud-
get of 0.1, as shown in Figure 1 (b), we obtain a more ro-
bust model that can only defend against the attacks with a
strength less than the budget of 0.1; this model is still easily
attacked when encountering a larger attack. Furthermore, it
is found from TCC that the AT with excessive budget can-
not ensure the robustness; this is attributed to the AEs from
different labels going beyond the decision boundary and
overlapping or touching each other, preventing the model
updating for greater robustness. Moreover, the results of
FGSM-AT and PGD-AT on several datasets also show the
deficiencies of the prescribed budget, as shown in Figure 2
and Appendix C.
By contrast, the unrestricted AT approaches are not af-
fected by the prescribed budget and use unconstrained AEs
with enough perturbations (beyond the decision boundary).
To date, many types of unconstrained AEs have been ex-
amined; for example, DeepFool [18] attempts to obtain the
smallest AEs aiming for the decision boundary, and CW [3]
can obtain AEs that balance the perturbation and confi-
dence. While we can directly apply these AEs to AT, the
basic motivation of unconstrained AEs is to attack while
aiming to fool the model by using the AEs beyond the de-
cision boundary. DDN-AT [24] decouples the direction and
norm of gradient-based attacks while inheriting the advan-
tages of high computational efficiency, while MMA train-
ing [4], focuses on maximizing the margins, which is an
alternative approach for selecting the budget for each point
individually. These methods inherit the perturbation of AEs
and change the norm toward the decision boundary. Based
on the obtained numerical experience, the loss function gra-
dients are unstable in this case, leading to dramatic decision
boundary fluctuations, and giving rise to a very large num-
ber of AEs with too large strength; this severely decreases
the robustness and lowers the accuracy on clean data. Fur-
thermore, the discussion below indicates that the uncon-
strained AEs on the decision boundary cannot ensure the
best robustness.
Addressing the above issues for both restricted and unre-
stricted ATs, this paper theoretically analyzes the impact of
the AEs budgets on AT using a simple classification prob-
lem, and proposes a novel AT approach named blind adver-
sarial training (BAT) that uses a cutoff-scale (CoS) strat-
egy to ameliorate the generation of the AEs during training.
The steps of the BAT procedure are summarized as follows:
after obtaining the AEs by DeepFool at each AE generation
step, we cutoff the AEs by an adaptive budget (the mean
value of the norm of the current AEs), and then uniformly
scale them. The cutoff is used to fix the AEs with large or
even unreasonable strength, so as to approach the perfect
decision boundary. The scale is used to prevent the AEs
from going over the decision boundary. Both strategies will
adaptively estimate a nonuniform budget and ensure that the
AEs are located in a reasonable range in blind; this approach
tends to obtain a model that is robust overall.
As shown in Figure 1 (c) for the TCC problem, BAT
can generate a model with an exactly regular octagon de-
cision boundary, i.e., the model with the best robustness
within the given network architecture, without budget pre-
scribed. Furthermore, compared with the FGSM-, PGD-
and DeepFool-based ATs, using BAT to train LeNet-5 on
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and SVHN, FitNet-4 on CIFAR10
and CIFAR100, we can obtain models with comprehensive
robustness, obtaining both high accuracy and robustness
for various white/black-box attacks (including the FGSM,
Noise, PGD, DeepFool and CW attacks) with varying at-
tack strength. In addition, for MNIST, we clearly find that
both the cutoff and scale strategies make significant individ-
ual contributions to BAT.
2. Methodology
2.1. Restricted Adversarial Training
We consider a standard classification task with dataset
{x,y} and minimizing minθ E(x,y)[L(θ,x,y)], where L is
the loss function with weights θ. Adversarial training (AT)
is also called brute-force AT, first proposed by Szegedy et
al. [29] and further developed by Goodfellow et al. [7]. The
core idea of AT is to enhance the robustness through adding
the AEs to the training data; here, the total loss function
can be written in a general form minθ E(x,y)[L(θ,x,y) +
λL(θ,x + δ(x),y)], where x + δ(x) represents the AEs of
data x and is usually set to λ = 1. AT will alternately gen-
erate AEs and optimize network parameters until the levels
of accuracy on clean data and AEs converge. To generate
AEs, Madry et al. [16] introduced a set of allowed pertur-
bations S that formalize the manipulative power of the ad-
versary, usually using the `∞-ball around x with the bud-
get ε as S [7], so that the AT process can be reformulated
as minθ E(x,y) maxδ(x)∈S L(θ,x + δ(x),y). This saddle
point optimization problem specifies a clear goal of a ro-
bust classifier. The inner “max” (adversarial loss) aims to
find an AE of the given data x, while the outer “min” finds
a model that minimizes the adversarial loss. These AEs can
be easily simplified to the widely accepted and used FGSM
or PGD [16].
Most neural networks are highly non-linear and com-
plex. To theoretically analyze AT, we start from a simpli-
fied 1-layer perceptron defined as, y = σ(Wx + b). For
classifying two points x1,x2, it is easy to know that the de-
cision boundary of the model with best robustness falls on
the perpendicular bisector of the two points. The follow-
ing proposition can guarantee improved performance of AT
(details in Appendix D.3),
Proposition 1. For classifying two points x1,x2 with a 1-
layer perceptron model, while both restricted AT and NT
can obtain the model with the best robustness, the perfor-
mance of restricted AT is much better than that of NT be-
cause the prescribed budget accelerates the learning pro-
cess.
In fact, the best budgets (with maximum acceleration) of
different data are different and unpredictable, so that any
prescribed uniform budget may lead some of the AEs to
be located beyond the decision boundary; thus, the use of
a uniform budget is not appropriate. Meanwhile, numeri-
cal results show that the robustness is directly related to the
budget, so that the choice of the budget is important and is
a difficult problem in restricted AT.
2.2. Unrestricted Adversarial Training
To blind the budget of restricted AT, an intuitive ap-
proach is to use the unconstrained AEs (with both the at-
tacking ability and the minimal norm) during AT, formally
min
θ
E(x,y) max
δ(x)
{L(θ,x + δ(x),y)− λ||δ(x)||}, (1)
where L(θ,x + δ(x),y) term corresponds to guarantee the
attacking ability, and λ||δ(x)|| term constraint the norm
small. An example of an alternative approach to generate
the AEs is DeepFool [18], which minimizes the `2 norm
of AEs slightly beyond the decision boundary of the cur-
rent model. The AT with unconstrained AEs may obtain a
more robust model than NT, but cannot ensure better perfor-
mance than restricted AT and incur a heavy cost in terms of
accuracy loss. Similarly, we state the following proposition
(details in Appendix D.4),
Proposition 2. For classifying two points x1,x2 with a 1-
layer perceptron model, unrestricted AT cannot be used to
obtain the model with the best robustness.
While simply using unconstrained AEs in unrestricted
AT avoids the shortcoming of choosing a prescribed budget,
the AEs located on the decision boundary ensure that the
model with the best robustness cannot be obtained. On the
contrary, this will lead to obtaining a model with a more
poor decision boundary.
2.3. Blind Adversarial Training
Therefore, to alleviate the drawbacks of the restricted
and unrestricted AT, we propose a cutoff-scale (CoS) strat-
egy based on the DeepFool-AT (DF-AT) in (1), and name
our approach blind adversarial training (BAT). We choose
DeepFool AEs in AT because the unrestricted AE method
DeepFool aims for the decision boundary of a model and
obtains AEs that are slightly beyond the boundary with rel-
atively small computational complexity compared to the
other similar methods. BAT can be formulated as
min
θ
E(x,y) max
δ(x)
{L(θ,x + ρδ(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Scale
,y)
−λ1||δ(x)|| − λ2(||δ(x)|| − ε)+︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cutoff
}, (2)
where coefficient λ2  λ1, and we introduce two parame-
ters ε and ρ to monitor the cutoff and the scale process, re-
spectively. L(θ,x + δ(x),y) and λ||δ(x)|| terms work the
same as unrestricted AT for guarantee the attacking ability
and minimal norm.
The motivation of the cutoff and scale is to ensure that
the AEs are dynamically located in a reasonable range such
that the AT model can be robust when encountering an at-
tack with varying strength. We use the cutoff to further pe-
nalize the AEs with a norm larger than the budget ε. Similar
to the inner problem in (1), we can alternatively solve the
inner problem in (2) followed by the DeepFool AEs. Due
to the dramatic fluctuations in the decision boundary during
training, the cutoff can avoid the AEs with a large or even
unreasonable strength, e.g., some failure or overestimation
AEs of DeepFool, limiting the AEs to lie within the per-
fect decision boundary. We use the scale to prevent the AEs
from going over the decision boundary, i.e., preventing the
AEs from different labels from touching each other.
The procedure of BAT is given in Algorithm 1. Starting
with the AEs generated by DeepFool which corresponds to
only maximizing the first two terms in the objective of (2)
(with ρ = 1), we simply calculate the third term (equiva-
lent to minimizing (||δ(x)|| − ε)+) by cutting off the per-
turbations of AEs with a norm larger than ε, defined by
cut{δ(x), ε} : if ||δ(x)|| > ε, δ(x) ← δ(x)/||δ(x)|| · ε;
otherwise, no change on δ(x). Then, we scale the new per-
turbations with weight ρ and add these CoS AEs into the
training process, i.e., {x+ρδ(x)}. We set ε = E||δ(x)|| and
ρ < 1 (a predefined parameter), corresponding to adaptively
estimating a nonuniform budget. cut{δ(x),E||δ(x)||} im-
plies that the budget ε ← E||δ(x)|| is computed prior to
cutting off the perturbations δ(x).
Similar to the restricted and unrestricted AT, it can be
proved theoretically for BAT that (details in Appendix D.5),
Proposition 3. For classifying two points x1,x2 with a 1-
layer perceptron model, BAT also can obtain the model with
Algorithm 1 Blind Adversarial Training (BAT)
Input: Dataset {x,y} and hyper-parameters (scale factor
ρ, learning rate α).
Output: Model θ.
Initialize model θ.
repeat
LC = L(θ,x,y), . Loss on clean data
δ(x) = xadv − x, . xadv: DeepFool AEs
ε = Ex ||δ(x)||2, . Adaptive Cutoff budget
δCo(x) = cut{δ(x), ε}, . Cutoff AEs
δCoS(x) = ρδCo(x), . Scale AEs
xCoS = x + δCoS(x), . Get CoS AEs
LAE = L(θ,xCoS,y), . Loss on CoS AEs
θ = θ−α(∇θLC +∇θLAE), . Update with total loss
until avg-AA(1) converge. . comprehensive robustness
the best robustness, and has the same convergence property
as restricted AT with best budget.
Therefore, BAT not only avoids the difficulty of making
the best choice of the budget, but also provides an AT ap-
proach that can dynamically adjust a nonuniform budget,
seek to provide a path to potentially guess the perfect deci-
sion boundary, and finally reach the model with best robust-
ness. Therefore, we name this approach blind adversarial
training.
Adversarial Accuracy. To evaluate the performance of
AT, some approaches use adversarial perturbations or their
average as the measurement [3, 21]; however, this makes AT
sensitive to the AEs with a large norm. Other approaches
instead use the accuracy under adversarial attacks with the
given budget [7, 16]. However, a fixed attack budget cannot
generally demonstrate the full robustness of a model, since
any model can be attacked in the absence of restrictions on
the attack budget. Correspondingly, we propose a new eval-
uation criterion, named adversarial accuracy (AA), to mon-
itor the training process. AA is defined as the accuracy
curve for white-box attacks with varying attack strength:
AA(ε) = A(x + cut{δ(x), ε}) (3)
where A(·) is the accuracy of the given data. AA can be
considered as an evaluation of comprehensive robustness.
To simplify the expression, average adversarial accuracy
(avg-AA) is defined to show the overall robustness in an
interval [0,Θ],
avg-AA(Θ) = 1
Θ
∫ Θ
0
AA(ε)dε. (4)
A larger avg-AA means that the model shows more
robustness under the attacks with maximum budget Θ.
Clearly, clean data accuracy is a special case of AA
and avg-AA with 0 attack strength, avg-AA(0) =
limΘ→0 1Θ
∫ Θ
0
AA(ε)dε = AA(0) = A(x).
Table 1. Parameters of AEs
AEs Parameter Value
FGSM Perturbation Norm-constrainedTypes of norm `∞
Noise Perturbation Norm-constrainedTypes of norm `∞
PGD
Perturbation Norm-constrained
Types of norm `∞
Number of step 20
Perturbation per step ε/10
Initial perturbation ε/2
DeepFool
Perturbation Unconstrained
Types of norm `2
Number of step 10
Overshoot 0.02
CW
Perturbation Unconstrained
Types of norm `2
Number of step 100 with abort early
Learning rate 0.01
Confidence 0
Binary search steps 10
3. Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the BAT approach on various
benchmark datasets, facing FGSM [7], Noise [6], PGD [16],
DeepFool [18] and CW [3] attacks. The code for these
experiments is based on the open source library clever-
hans [20]. We consider using BAT to train LeNet-5 [15]
for MNIST [15], Fashion-MNIST [32] and SVHN [19],
and train FitNet-4 [23] for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 [11].
We compare the BAT approach with several state-of-the-art
training approaches, such as normal training (NT), FGSM-
AT (AT with FGSM AEs), PGD-AT (AT with PGD AEs),
and DF-AT (AT with DeepFool AEs).
Experimental setup. For all of the experiments, we
normalize the pixels to [0, 1] by dividing by 255, use la-
bel smoothing regularization [28] to avoid over-fitting, and
perform data augmentation (with a width/height shift range
of 0.1 and random flips) for the SVHN, CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 datasets to improve the clean data accuracy. For
the inner AE generations for all of the datasets, see Table 1
for details. For the outer training process in AT, we use
Adam optimization [10] and see Table 2 for details. We set
the scale parameter ρ = 0.9 in BAT for the final results.
Compute Overhead. As shown in Algorithm 1, the
main add-ons of BAT is the cutoff&scale strategy, which
is quite simple from the point of view of computation
cost. Thus the extra expense (compute/memory overhead)
of BAT than DF-AT is negligible.
Table 2. Parameters of AT
Dataset Nepochs Learning rate
MNIST 50 1e-3
Fashion-MNIST 70 1e-3
SVHN 300 1e-4
CIFAR-10 60 1e-4
CIFAR-100 100 1e-4
3.1. Overall Results
White-box attack results for BAT are shown in Figure 3
and Table 3 (facing `2 attacks) & Table 4 (facing `∞ at-
tacks), and are compared with the results obtained by the
NT, DF-AT, FGSM-AT and PGD-AT approaches in each
subfigure. We choose the most widely used prescribed bud-
gets for FGSM-AT/PGD-AT in the literature [7, 16, 26],
corresponding to the model with a relatively good robust-
ness. For all of these results, the BAT approach achieved
good comprehensive robustness and our results generally
among the highest-quality results and are shown as the
black solid lines in Figure 3. Comparison of the robustness
under different AT approaches and attack methods shows
that the use of the same AEs in both generation and evalu-
ation often shows good performance, such as for evaluating
FGSM-AT by the FGSM attack, PGD-AT by PGD and DF-
AT by DeepFool. By contrast, using different kinds of AEs
in the generation and evaluation may show relatively poor
results. As we expected, BAT can achieve a comprehensive
robust model, see Table 3 for the comparison of average
adversarial accuracy of DeepFool as Equation (4). We set
Θ = E||δ(x)|| and the half of it, due to application issues
are more concerned with the robustness facing AEs do not
exceed decision boundaries. It is clear that the avg-AA(Θ)
of BAT are in the top two of all datasets and ranking first
in most cases, show that our method can balance the clean
accuracy and the comprehensive robustness of the model.
DeepFool-AT is good at defending against large attacks, so
the score for large Θ is slightly higher than BAT in some
cases.
Next, we will provide a specific analysis for each AT
approach. The FGSM-AT approach is almost entirely un-
able to defend against attacks other than the FGSM at-
tack. The PGD-AT approach is slightly better for the
FGSM/PGD attack but is not good enough when confronted
with the Noise, DeepFool and CW attacks. The DF-AT ap-
proach can achieve models with good robustness, partic-
ularly when facing DeepFool and CW attacks with large
attack strengths, but the clean data accuracy is greatly re-
duced, and the AA is lower under small attacks. For all
of the datasets, the NT approach always attains the highest
clean data accuracy, while the BAT approach is second only
to NT and achieves a fairly high clean data accuracy com-
pared with the other AT approaches, as can be clearly ob-
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Figure 3. Comparison of the AA of BAT with NT, DF-AT, FGSM-AT and PGD-AT approaches for various datasets (MNIST, Fashion-
MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR10 and CIFAR100) and various white/black-box attacks (FGSM, Noise, PGD, DeepFool and CW attacks) with
varying attack strengths. The correspondence between the approaches (with the budget in brackets) and color/shape of the lines are shown
in the above legend.
Table 3. Comparison of the accuracy on clean data/AEs with varying attack strengths and avg-AA(Θ) (overall robustness, Eq. (4)) of BAT
with other approaches (with the prescribed budget) for various datasets and various `2 white/black-box attacks, The larger the average of
AEs norm (E||δ(x)||, denoted by ”Norm” in Table) corresponds to the robustness better. For black-box attacks, the mean value is that of
NT. We mark the highest result with red bold and the second highest result with blue underline.
Defense Clean avg-AA(Θ) DeepFool (`2) CW (`2)
W
hi
te
-b
ox
M
ni
st
Budget − 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.1 0.2 Norm 0.03 0.05 0.1 Norm
NT 99.3 28.7 49.8 4.2 0.6 0.6 0.035 58.4 0.7 0.6 0.03
FGSM(0.3) 99.3 26.0 45.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.031 14.2 0.6 0.6 0.023
PGD(0.3) 98.7 92.2 96.3 95.4 88.9 40.1 0.182 94.8 83.7 29.1 0.083
DF-AT 97.9 84.8 94.2 92.8 75.3 23.6 0.147 95.3 87.2 35.6 0.087
BAT 98.5 84.8 94.8 93.4 75.0 10.7 0.136 96.3 88.4 29.6 0.08
Fa
sh
io
n
Budget − 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.1 0.2 Norm 0.03 0.05 0.1 Norm
NT 92.3 22.4 35.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 0.011 5.8 5.8 5.8 0.01
FGSM(0.1) 92.5 17.2 26.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 0.007 5.5 5.5 5.5 0.005
PGD(0.1) 85.7 69.3 79.6 66.6 29.9 11.0 0.065 72.5 55.7 19.7 0.051
DF-AT 87.5 69.4 77.8 65.1 43.8 18.6 0.07 70.7 57.9 31.3 0.046
BAT 88.8 73.9 83.2 70.3 44.2 9.1 0.081 77.5 60.7 21.9 0.057
SV
H
N
Budget − 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.01 Norm 0.001 0.005 0.01 Norm
NT 88.9 44.6 65.4 69.0 6.9 6.3 0.002 70.7 6.6 6.4 0.001
FGSM(0.024) 88.3 43.0 63.5 66.9 7.1 6.6 0.002 69.3 6.7 6.6 0.001
PGD(0.024) 82.0 75.8 79.8 80.4 62.6 37.0 0.008 80.4 57.8 27.6 0.006
DF-AT 85.5 77.7 82.5 83.4 61.7 38.4 0.009 83.3 57.6 31.3 0.007
BAT 88.3 76.2 83.8 85.0 50.7 17.8 0.005 84.8 43.6 11.4 0.004
C
ifa
r1
0
Budget − 0.03 0.02 0.003 0.01 0.03 Norm 0.003 0.01 0.03 Norm
NT 92.0 58.9 67.5 77.2 64.0 33.2 0.029 60.0 33.2 20.7 0.0055
FGSM(0.024) 84.9 54.3 63.2 81.2 63.2 28.0 0.018 80.9 56.0 13.5 0.012
PGD(0.024) 84.0 57.3 65.2 81.5 65.5 33.7 0.022 81.3 59.3 14.7 0.013
DF-AT 81.3 62.9 68.3 78.9 68.3 46.8 0.037 78.8 63.5 26.8 0.016
BAT 85.8 62.3 68.8 82.0 68.8 42.8 0.032 81.8 62.0 20.3 0.015
C
ifa
r1
00
Budget − 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.01 0.03 Norm 0.003 0.01 0.03 Norm
NT 66.9 34.6 49.6 35.4 17.1 11.3 0.003 20.4 11.9 11.2 0.002
FGSM(0.024) 58.2 51.2 55.9 53.0 36.3 17.0 0.008 52.4 32.1 13.3 0.006
PGD(0.024) 57.5 51.4 55.6 52.9 37.4 17.9 0.009 52.2 33.4 13.2 0.007
DF-AT 59.4 52.2 57.0 54.1 38.9 21.5 0.012 53.2 35.2 16.3 0.008
BAT 63.7 52.8 59.7 54.5 32.5 14.5 0.007 53.4 25.1 12.1 0.005
B
la
ck
-b
ox
M
ni
st
Budget − 0.01 0.03 0.05 Norm 0.01 0.03 0.05 Norm
FGSM(0.3) 99.3 99.2 99.1 99.1 0.035 99.2 99.1 99.1 0.03
PGD(0.3) 98.7 98.6 98.5 98.5 0.035 98.6 98.5 98.5 0.03
DF-AT 97.9 97.8 97.7 97.7 0.035 97.8 97.8 97.8 0.03
BAT 98.5 98.3 98.2 98.2 0.035 98.3 98.3 98.3 0.03
Fa
sh
io
n
Budget − 0.01 0.03 0.05 Norm 0.01 0.03 0.05 Norm
FGSM(0.1) 92.5 90.5 90.0 90.0 0.011 90.2 89.9 89.9 0.01
PGD(0.1) 85.7 85.4 85.4 85.4 0.011 85.4 85.4 85.4 0.01
DF-AT 87.5 86.5 86.4 86.4 0.011 86.5 86.4 86.4 0.01
BAT 88.8 88.5 88.5 88.5 0.011 88.5 88.5 88.5 0.01
SV
H
N
Budget − 0.001 0.002 0.003 Norm 0.001 0.002 0.003 Norm
FGSM(0.024) 88.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 0.002 87.3 87.3 87.3 0.001
PGD(0.024) 82.0 81.5 81.5 81.5 0.002 81.4 81.4 81.4 0.001
DF-AT 85.5 85.1 85.1 85.1 0.002 85.1 85.1 85.1 0.001
BAT 88.3 88.0 88.0 88.0 0.002 88.0 88.0 88.0 0.001
C
ifa
r1
0
Budget − 0.001 0.002 0.003 Norm 0.001 0.002 0.003 Norm
FGSM(0.024) 84.9 84.5 84.2 84.0 0.029 84.8 84.8 84.8 0.0055
PGD(0.024) 84.0 83.7 83.5 83.3 0.029 83.9 83.9 83.9 0.0055
DF-AT 81.3 80.9 80.8 80.5 0.029 81.1 81.1 81.1 0.0055
BAT 85.8 84.5 84.3 84.1 0.029 84.8 84.8 84.8 0.0055
C
ifa
r1
00
Budget − 0.001 0.002 0.003 Norm 0.001 0.002 0.003 Norm
FGSM(0.024) 58.2 58.0 58.0 58.0 0.003 58.1 58.1 58.1 0.002
PGD(0.024) 57.5 57.4 57.4 57.4 0.003 57.4 57.4 57.4 0.002
DF-AT 59.4 59.3 59.3 59.3 0.003 59.3 59.3 59.3 0.002
BAT 63.7 63.5 63.5 63.5 0.003 63.5 63.5 63.5 0.002
served from an examination of the data presented in Table 3.
Accompanied by the high clean data accuracy, BAT returns
high-level AA with a small attack strength, as observed
from the data shown in red bold or blue underline in Table 3,
Table 4. Comparison of the accuracy on clean data and AEs with varying attack strengths (small, medium and large) of BAT with other
approaches (with the prescribed budget in brackets) for various datasets and various `∞ white/black-box attacks, the Noise attack in the
white-box is also a black-box attack. We mark the highest result with red bold and the second highest result with blue underline. Notice
that BAT has zero knowledge about the attack budgets, even so it still performs well in most cases.
Defense Clean FGSM (`∞) Noise (`∞) PGD (`∞)
W
hi
te
-b
ox
M
ni
st
Budget − 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3
NT 99.3 84.4 12.8 6.3 99.3 87.7 31.7 23.8 0.5 0.5
FGSM(0.3) 99.3 97.0 99.3 73.8 99.1 94.8 27.4 15.9 0.6 0.6
PGD(0.3) 98.7 98.3 97.3 42.3 98.7 98.5 51.9 98.0 96.6 93.8
DF-AT 97.9 95.9 79.3 40.9 97.7 95.3 73.6 95.1 77.4 22.7
BAT 98.5 96.7 82.2 45.8 98.3 97.3 78.9 95.6 72.6 5.8
Fa
sh
io
n
Budget − 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.1 0.2
NT 92.3 21.6 6.7 4.6 90.0 78.5 35.0 5.1 4.5 3.3
FGSM(0.1) 92.5 83.9 91.5 59.0 87.5 77.4 34.3 5.1 4.8 3.8
PGD(0.1) 85.7 82.9 78.5 45.1 85.4 85.1 48.1 81.7 74.6 7.5
DF-AT 87.5 77.7 70.1 57.4 83.6 81.5 73.7 72.9 49.0 11.3
BAT 88.8 83.1 75.0 60.3 88.4 87.4 79.4 79.4 42.3 5.8
SV
H
N
Budget − 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.001 0.005 0.01
NT 88.9 5.4 5.6 6.0 69.8 39.2 18.2 78.9 12.5 5.6
FGSM(0.024) 88.3 68.3 47.5 36.8 56.4 29.8 18.4 77.4 11.2 5.7
PGD(0.024) 82.0 26.7 11.6 10.1 79.2 73.5 52.8 81.8 78.1 69.5
DF-AT 85.5 27.3 18.8 16.4 63.9 43.4 27.7 84.7 73.8 54.9
BAT 88.3 7.2 5.1 7.0 84.5 72.0 43.2 86.9 67.8 35.5
C
ifa
r1
0
Budget − 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.003 0.01 0.03
NT 92.0 56.0 35.0 16.4 80.0 53.8 21.6 76.4 58.7 39.5
FGSM(0.024) 84.9 45.4 35.3 28.3 83.5 77.7 58.1 83.3 74.1 41.9
PGD(0.024) 84.0 45.9 34.6 26.5 83.3 79.6 61.3 83.7 76.6 46.6
DF-AT 81.3 54.1 46.3 36.7 79.9 72.5 51.1 80.8 72.2 50.1
BAT 85.8 53.7 45.9 34.6 85.0 79.1 57.2 83.4 73.8 46.8
C
ifa
r1
00
Budget − 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.003 0.01 0.03
NT 66.9 39.0 29.3 20.1 43.6 18.3 6.1 39.3 22.5 13.1
FGSM(0.024) 58.2 47.5 30.8 23.1 56.3 47.8 19.2 56.0 44.5 21.3
PGD(0.024) 57.5 49.0 32.9 24.3 56.2 47.6 17.9 56.0 46.8 24.4
DF-AT 59.4 47.1 32.0 24.6 57.4 47.8 23.6 56.1 44.0 23.4
BAT 63.7 46.0 28.1 22.0 60.1 43.0 14.7 58.7 39.3 17.1
B
la
ck
-b
ox
M
ni
st
Budget − 0.1 0.3 0.5 − − − 0.1 0.3 0.5
FGSM(0.3) 99.3 98.3 88.0 14.6 98.2 90.5 16.8
PGD(0.3) 98.7 98.4 97.3 26.9 98.4 97.8 20.2
DF-AT 97.9 97.2 90.0 37.0 97.3 92.7 64.3
BAT 98.5 97.8 92.7 35.2 97.7 94.0 53.7
Fa
sh
io
n
Budget − 0.05 0.1 0.2 − − − 0.05 0.1 0.2
FGSM(0.1) 92.5 79.1 68.9 25.5 67.5 59.0 17.5
PGD(0.1) 85.7 84.3 82.9 37.3 84.3 83.4 45.7
DF-AT 87.5 82.0 78.3 64.8 82.3 79.4 72.2
BAT 88.8 86.4 81.2 53.3 86.3 82.6 64.5
SV
H
N
Budget − 0.001 0.005 0.01 − − − 0.001 0.005 0.01
FGSM(0.024) 88.3 79.1 44.8 21.6 76.3 52.0 22.7
PGD(0.024) 82.0 79.2 64.7 42.3 79.4 66.0 49.6
DF-AT 85.5 79.8 48.2 32.3 80.2 55.2 39.9
BAT 88.3 82.8 46.5 22.8 82.0 36.3 14.1
C
ifa
r1
0
Budget − 0.05 0.1 0.2 − − − 0.05 0.1 0.2
FGSM(0.024) 84.9 80.9 70.8 42.6 83.8 81.1 69.4
PGD(0.024) 84.0 81.2 72.4 42.8 83.1 81.5 72.0
DF-AT 81.3 77.4 62.9 37.4 80.2 77.3 62.8
BAT 85.8 80.3 65.8 35.8 83.4 80.3 65.2
C
ifa
r1
00
Budget − 0.001 0.005 0.01 − − − 0.001 0.005 0.01
FGSM(0.024) 58.2 57.6 53.0 33.9 57.7 56.7 53.2
PGD(0.024) 57.5 57.3 53.2 34.2 57.2 56.6 53.5
DF-AT 59.4 57.3 53.2 34.2 59.0 57.4 53.9
BAT 63.7 62.7 50.1 23.6 63.0 61.0 52.8
along with a slight loss on AA when facing a large attack
strength compared to that of DF-AT. The FGSM, Noise and
PGD used in the results are based on the `∞ norm, BAT/DF-
AT has zero knowledge about the attack budgets, thus the
comparison with restricted AT (FGSM/PGD-AT) is slightly
unfair for BAT/DF-AT. It is observed that even though BAT
is based on the `2 norm, it still shows a fairly high robust-
ness on the `∞ norm in most cases.
Black-box attack results for BAT are also shown in Fig-
ure 3 and Table 3 (facing `2 attacks) & Table 4 (facing
`∞ attacks). For fairness and realism, we use NT models
to generate black-box AEs for attacking other approaches.
Here, the AA is computed under black-box AEs with vary-
ing attack strengths. In fact, the Noise attack in the white-
box attack is also a black-box attack. Overall, it is clear
that the AA of the black-box AEs should be greater than
that of the white-box AEs. The results show that the BAT
approach can provide a better defense against black-box at-
tacks in most cases, as is particularly pronounced for the
FGSM and PGD attacks. For the DeepFool and CW attacks,
most AT approaches can achieve high-level AA. Because
the NT models are too vulnerable to these two attacks, these
AEs from NT models always have norms that are too small
and can be easily defended by the AT models.
3.2. Influence of Cutoff and Scale Strategies
We test the influence of the cutoff and scale on MNIST.
The results for the influence of the cutoff are shown in Fig-
ure 4 (a-b), with ρ = 1 such that it is ineffective in terms
of the scale part. It is clear that with the stricter cutoff pa-
rameter ε, the AA with the attack strength larger than ε
decreases, but the AA with a smaller attack strength do
not change significantly. To show the trend of decreasing
ε more clearly, we plot the clean data accuracy A(0) and
avg-AA(0.3) in Figure 4 (b). We choose Θ = 0.3 to elu-
cidate the influence of the ε variation on the comprehensive
robustness, since the AA is almost 0 if the attack strength
> 0.3. The results clearly support our intuition that as ε
is adjusted from 1 to 0, avg-AA(0.3) decreases and A(0)
increases. Based on this, we also plot the A(0) and avg-
AA(0.3) of BAT (solid dots) in Figure 4 (b). Surprisingly,
the results show that our BAT approach can adaptively es-
timate a good budget and obtain the model with both high
clean data accuracy and comprehensive robustness. If the
budget is adaptively estimated to be slightly larger, the avg-
AA(0.3) does not grow strongly butA(0) sharply declines;
however, if the budget is adaptively estimated to be slightly
smaller, the avg-AA(0.3) will decrease sharply.
The results for the influence of the scale are shown in
Figure 4 (c-d), where we set ε = 1 such that it is ineffective
in terms of the cutoff part. The results show a trend simi-
lar to the trend observed for the cutoff, but as ρ decreases,
the AA of the whole area declines proportionately, which
is consistent with the scale principle. As shown in Figure 4
(d), as ρ decreases, the avg-AA(0.3) shows a relatively uni-
form downward trend, andA(0) is more sensitive for a large
ρ. This feature encourages us to choose ρ = 0.9 in this
work, and the results for A(0) and avg-AA(0.3) of BAT
(solid dots) shown in Figure 4 (d) also support this choice.
In fact, from another point of view, we may also consider
BAT in (2) as a comprehensive approach of NT (the train-
ing without using AEs) and DF-AT in (1). We indicate that
the BAT approach with cutoff ε = 1 and scale ρ = 1 re-
duces to the DF-AT approach because there is no change to
the AEs from DeepFool. Moreover, the BAT approach with
ε = 0 or ρ = 0 is identical to the NT approach, where the
zero parameter of the cutoff or scale compresses the AEs
back to the clean data. Therefore, the cutoff and scale strat-
egy can connect and carry out the transition from DF-AT to
NT with adjusting parameters ε and ρ. The numerical re-
sults in Figure 4 show that the DF-AT approach can obtain
a model with high robustness when encountering large at-
tack strength, while the NT approach can clearly produce a
model with high clean data accuracy. The proposed cutoff
and scale strategy in BAT attempts to provide an approach
combining the advantages of both DF-AT and NT, dynam-
ically adjust a nonuniform budget in blind, and the model
search has relatively high clean data accuracy and compre-
hensive robustness at the same time.
4. Conclusion and Future Work
Both restricted and unrestricted AT approaches cannot
obtain a comprehensively robust model. To alleviate this
problem, this paper proposes the blind adversarial train-
ing (BAT) approach that ameliorates the problem by using
the cutoff-scale strategy in order to adaptively estimate a
nonuniform budget in the generation of each AE during the
training; this approach tends to obtain an comprehensively
robust model, where adversarial accuracy is used as the
measure for the evaluation of comprehensive robustness.
By using BAT to train the classification models on several
benchmarks, we obtain comprehensive robust models with
both high accuracy and robustness for various white/black-
box attacks with multiple attack methods and varying at-
tack strengths. The individual contribution of the cutoff and
scale are well-addressed for the MNIST dataset. In sum-
mary, the proposed BAT approach shows competitive per-
formance.
The present research is still in the early stage. There are
several aspects that deserve deeper investigation:
• Theoretical analysis of BAT behavior for the more gen-
eral classification problems, like two circles classifica-
tion problem defined in Figure 1;
• Design other kinds of adaptive budgets to improve the
cutoff strategy, like using DDN [24] instead of Deep-
Fool to generate AEs in BAT;
• Investigate the performance of BAT on more complex
models or datasets, such as ImageNet;
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Figure 4. Influence of the cutoff (varying ε) and scale (varying ρ) strategies. Subfigures (a-d) show the plots of AA, clean data accuracy
and avg-AA(0.3), respectively, obtained by sequentially varying ε and ρ. The solid dots in subfigures (b,d) show the clean accuracy and
avg-AA(0.3) of BAT with the budget adaptively estimated using ε and ρ, respectively.
• Combine BAT and model pruning, i.e. adaptively gen-
erating AEs into the model pruning process, to develop
an approach that can better balance the accuracy, ro-
bustness and efficiency.
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Appendix
In order to better support the views and results of the pa-
per, we elaborate this appendix. In Section A, the notations
and definitions used in main text are listed. In Section B,
the two circles classification problem is analyzed in detail.
In Section C, we list and compare all numerical results of
datasets and attack methods mentioned in main text. In Sec-
tion D, Given the mathematical proof of the three proposi-
tions in Section 2 of main text.
A. Notations and Definitions
Table 5 & 6 list the notations and definitions used in main
text of this paper.
Table 5. Notations
Notations Full name
AEs Adversarial Examples
AT Adversarial Training
NT Normal Training
BAT Blind Adversarial Training
TCC Two Circles Classification
CoS Cutoff-Scale
AA Adversarial Accuracy
avg-AA Average Adversarial Accuracy
FGSM Fast Gradient Sign Method
PGD Projected Gradient Descent
CW Carlini and Wagner Attacks method
DF DeepFool
L(θ,x,y) Loss function
δ(x) Adversarial perturbation
η Prescribed uniform budget of AT
ε Cutoff parameter of BAT
ρ Scale parameter of BAT
Table 6. Definitions
Names Definitions
Budget
A parameter to constrain
the magnitude of AE
perturbation during AT.
Norm
The norm of the AE
perturbation, include
`0, `2 and `∞ etc.
Weak attack
Attack the model by AEs
with small norm, expression
as the AEs is far from
reaching the decision boundary.
B. Supplementary Numerical Results for the
Two Circles Classification Problem
Model overview: As discussed in Section 1 (main text),
we using BAT into the two circles classification (TCC)
problem in two dimension. The target of TCC problem is
to train a classifier to distinguish two concentric circles as
shown in figure 5 (a). We randomly sample 5000 in train-
data and 1000 in test-data which is large enough for the
TCC problem, and use the simplest 1-hidden-layer 6-dim
perceptron as classifier. With the input coordinate x1,x2 ∈
[−1, 1] and output label y ∈ [0, 1], the boundary at y = 0.5
is a polygon on the two dimensional plane, which ideally
approaching to regular polygon close to the mid-circle of
two labels with radius as r = r1+r22 . The loss of TCC prob-
lem is
L(θ,x,y) = Ex (C(x)− y)2 (5)
Robustness: TCC problem is analytical with 100% ac-
curacy, adversarial perturbations ε(x) can be exact calcu-
lated by the nearest distance between input-data x and the
decision boundary of the model, ε(x) = min ||C−1(y =
0.5) − x||, where C−1(y = 0.5) is the decision boundary
of the classifier C, i.e. the polygons between the two circles
in Figure 5 (a-d). Define η as the minimum of perturbations,
η = min ε(x), during CoS strategy. Since theAA(η) is ex-
actly 100%, higher η means more robustness. The AA in
TCC problem is replaced by η.
Training strategy: We compare normal training (NT),
Adversarial Training (AT), NT with AA and Blind Adver-
sarial Training (BAT) in Figure 5 (a-d). Figure 5 (a) lists
an example of a model by NT with accuracy 100% but with
poor robustness. AT could improve a little but still far from
its best, NT with AA shows better result with closer to reg-
ular hexagon than AT, while BAT could get the best result
and further push the model close to the regular octagon.
These results clearly demonstrate the individual contribu-
tion of CoS and AA.
Contribution of AA: To clarify the comparison, we in-
vestigate the details of the training process. If we train the
model until accuracy 100%, see the left dotted black line in
Figure 5 (e), we may get the corresponding model with poor
robustness, see Figure 5 (a). Then if we use AA to moni-
tor the training, when AA converge, see the right dotted
black line in Figure 5 (e), we may get a better model, see
Figure 5 (c). While at the same time, the adversarial per-
turbations correspondingly change as that in Table 7, from
which we found AA will lead the model to the one with
about maximum minimal attack cost. That may guarantee
the individual contribution of AA.
(e) Accuracy and Loss in NT (f) Norm of Adversarial perturbations in NT (g) Minimal Adversarial perturbations
Angle
Epoch Epoch Epoch
(d) Blind Adversarial Training(c) Normal Training
with Adversarial Accuracy
(b) Adversarial Training(a) Normal Training
Figure 5. Comparison of different training approaches employing the two circles classification problem with the 1-hidden-layer 6-dim
perceptron, learning rate α = 0.2, the radius of a circles r1 = 0.3, r2 = 0.7. (a-d) Compare the result of normal training (NT), adversarial
training with a budget of 0.1, NT with AA as convergence cohesion and blind adversarial training. The solid blue/red lines correspond to
the datasets of two labels; the solid gray lines represent the decision boundary of the classifiers. (e) Accuracy and Loss in NT converge
with epochs. (f) Maximum, minimum and average of adversarial perturbation in NT converge with epochs. (g) Compare the robustness
converge with epochs and (inner) the exact perturbation at each angle (from the polar coordinate of the circles) by using NT with AA (c)
and BAT (d).
Contribution of CoS: However, even though AA con-
verges, the minimal adversarial perturbation have not
reached its maximum if we keep training with huge num-
ber of epochs, see the curves of minimal adversarial per-
turbation in Figure 5 (f). But the 106 epochs is unaccept-
able for actual training, especially it may lead over-fitting
for more practical problems. The reason of 106 epochs re-
quiring may due to that the data is far from the boundary
of the network after 6000 epochs and then its contribution
of enhancing network’s robustness is weakness. While AT
may relieve this but its improvement is still limited since
the threshold is fixed, see Figure 5 (b). The proposed CoS
strategy will dynamically adjust the threshold, pushing the
model quickly flows to its best position, see Figure 5 (d,g).
From Figure 5 (g), BAT converges faster and still has out-
standing improvement after 6000 epochs, compared with
NT with AA. We also plot the exact perturbation at each
angle by NT with AA and BAT, the result of BAT more
robustness than NT with AA, which can be understand as
the force exerted by CoS-AEs on model is more powerful
than clean data, as CoS-AEs can keep the manifold of clean
data, it can push the model to a better position. These results
clearly demonstrates the individual contribution of CoS.
Result comparison: Table 7 compares the robustness (the
minimal norm of adversarial perturbation) of several train-
ing and evaluation methods for TCC problem that is corre-
sponding to Figure 5 (a-d), where the Hexagon and Octagon
represent the theoretical results when the boundaries of net-
works are exact Hexagon and Octagon in the middle of two
circles. NT only get 100% accuracy but can not guarantee
the robustness. AT is better than NT but only can defense
the adversarial attacks below to trained threshold. From Ta-
ble 7 we can find that AA will improve the robustness of
NT and AT, even close to the result of the Hexagon, but con-
verge slower and slower due to the gradient descent quickly.
While the proposed CoS (BAT) will leap the model towards
Octagon, get most robustness result then others.
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Figure 6. Comparison of the accuracy against attacks with varying budgets (x-axis of the third row) of the AT models (FGSM-AT/PGD-AT)
with varying budgets (the lines in the sub-figures of the first two rows) on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. We
also show the accuracy on clean data in the sub-figures of the third row.
Table 7. Compare the robustness (the minimal norm of adversarial
perturbation) of several training and evaluation methods.
Training Evaluation Robustness
NT Acc. 0
AT Acc. 0.13
NT AA 0.162
AT AA 0.162
Hexagon Upper bond 0.164
BAT AA 0.175
Octagon Upper bond 0.180
C. Supplementary Numerical Results for
Benchmark Datasets
C.1. Restricted Adversarial Training
As shown in Figure 2 (main text), we train FGSM-
AT/PGD-AT models with varying budgets (the lines), and
then attack these AT models using AEs generated with vary-
ing budgets (the x-axis). Figure 6 shows more numerical
results about FGSM-AT/PGD-AT. Analogous to the TCC
problem, if we train with a small budget, the AT model is
always easily attacked with a large budget; note the drop
in the accuracy when the models are trained with a budget
larger than 0.5 for FGSM-AT (the first row of Figure 6) and
the ones with a budget larger than 0.6 for PGD-AT (the sec-
ond row of Figure 6). In addition, if we train with a large
budget, the AT model is even weak when confronting the
attack with a small budget. Furthermore, the improvement
on robustness also has a remarkable influence on the clean
data accuracy, as shown in the third row of Figure 6. Based
on the existing numerical experiments and references, we
can summarize that the model obtained with the prescribed
budget is only robust when encountering the attack with the
same strength. The model is obviously weak when facing
an attack that is stronger than the prescribed budget used in
AE generation and is overly defensive when facing a small
attack or on clean data.
C.2. Time Cost
All experiments are implemented on single NVIDIA
Tesla V100 GPU. For DF-AT and BAT, It cost about a
hour’s magnitude for training MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and
SVHN datasets, and a few hours for training CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100.
As shown in the Algorithm in main text, the main add-
ons of BAT is CoS strategy, which is very simple from the
point of view of computation cost. Thus the extra expense
of BAT than DF-AT is negligible.
D. Prove details in Section 2
This section explains in detail the derivation process of
the Propositions in Section 2 (main text).
D.1. Model and basic assumptions
Most neural networks are highly non-linear and com-
plex, to theoretical analysis AT, we use a simplified 1-layer
perceptron defined as, y = σ(Wx + b), which is used in
d2
d1
Perfect 
Decision 
Boundary
Wi=0,i≥2
Any 
Decision 
Boundary
Wi≠0,i≥2
Maximum
Distence
x1ˆ
x
i,
i
≥
2
ˆ x1ˆ x2ˆ
Figure 7. Sketch map of the model, only perfect decision boundary
with Wi = 0, i ≥ 2 has the maximum distance between data and
decision boundary.
TCC problem in Section 1 (main text). It is usually use sig-
moid activation function σ(x) = 11+e−x . In order to study
the impact of AEs on neural networks more clearly, we con-
sider a pair of neighbor data x1,x2 within different labels
y1,y2, and the corresponding AEs represent as x1adv,x
2
adv.
In this way, we can clearly analysis the impact of the two
data, and deduce the general nature of AEs during AT.
We hope to get a constructive conclusion from the strict
extrapolation of the simple problem, and then generalize
and expand it to a general model to reveal the effectiveness
and significance of the proposed BAT approach.
Lemma 1. ∀ x1,x2 ∈ Rd, ∃ a linear transformation matrix
consist of translation, rotate and scale, M = TRS. After
transformation xˆ = Mx, must have xˆ1 = (−1, 0ˆ)T, xˆ2 =
(1, 0ˆ)T, where 0ˆ ∈ Rd−1 is d− 1 dimensional zero vector.
Thus, without loss of generality, we only consider data
xˆ1, xˆ2 with y1 = 0,y2 = 1. Now, we can assume the
perceptron is monotonic in concerned region xˆ ∈ [xˆ1, xˆ2]
corresponding y ∈ [0, 1].
D.2. Normal Training
Let’s take the square loss as an example, the loss-
function during NT can be written as,
LNT = min
W,b
{
∑
i=1,2
[σ(Wxi + b)− yi]2
+λ||W||2 + λ||b||2 } , (6)
where λ is Lagrange multiplier for regularization and be
very small, due to the data has no constraints on the sub-
sequent components of parameter W(Wi, i ≥ 2). It is easy
to bring in data and get the minimum value by,
∂LNT
∂b
= 2[σ(W1(−1) + b)− 0]σ′(W1(−1) + b)
+ 2[σ(W1(1) + b)− 1]σ′(W1(1) + b)
+ λsign(b) = 0 (7)
∂LNT
∂W1
= 2[σ(W1(−1) + b)− 0]σ′(W1(−1) + b)(−1)
+ 2[σ(W1(1) + b)− 1]σ′(W1(1) + b)(1)
+ λsign(W1) = 0 (8)
∂LNT
∂Wi
= λsign(Wi), i ≥ 2. (9)
Obviously, with the derivative form of activation func-
tion σ′(x) = σ(x)(1 − σ(x)), and σ(−x) = (1 − σ(x)).
Simultaneous these equations, always satisfied σ(x) > 0
and σ′(x) > 0, W1 and b can not be non-zero at the same
time. If W1 = 0, b 6= 0, the equations has no solution, thus
the minimum point is satisfied only when
b = 0 (10)
W1 satisfy λ(1 + e
W1)2(1 + e−W1) = 4 (11)
Wi = 0, i ≥ 2. (12)
From data xˆ1, xˆ2, it is intuitive to know the idea decision
boundary is the line of
xˆ1 =
xˆ11 + xˆ
2
1
2
= 0. (13)
Mathematically the decision boundary defined as
{xˆ|σ(Wxˆ + b) = 1
2
}, (14)
which can be reduced to
Wxˆ + b = 0. (15)
For the result of NT, bring in the minimum point and we
can know that the convergence limit of NT is correspond-
ing to the idea classifier with the perfect decision boundary.
As shown in Figure 7, only the line xˆ1 = 0 can make the
network have the maximum adversarial perturbation. Dif-
ferent λ produces differentW1 as in Figure 8, and the larger
W1 lead the output of network more close to 0 and 1, which
means the larger confidence.
D.3. Restricted Adversarial Training
Lemma 2. Gradient based constrained AEs generating
methods generate the AEs along xˆ1 axis. Written as,
xˆ1adv = (1− η)xˆ1 = (−1 + η, 0ˆ)T, (16)
xˆ2adv = (1− η)xˆ2 = (1− η, 0ˆ)T, (17)
where η ∈ [0, 2] is the adversarial perturbation, constraint
the AEs should between the two data xˆ1 and xˆ2.
λFigure 8. The value of λ and W1 that satisfies the Equation (11).
Proof. While usual AT approaches take NT with several
epochs as starting point, we assume that the Wi( i ≥ 2)
has converged quickly. Using FGSM AEs as an example,
xˆadv − xˆ = ηsign(∇L(xˆ, yˆ)), (18)
from Equation (9) & (12), the gradient of loss only have xˆ1
component, ∂L∂xˆi = 0, i ≥ 2.
Proposition 1. For classifying two points x1,x2 with a 1-
layer perceptron model, while both restricted AT and NT
can obtain the model with the best robustness, the perfor-
mance of restricted AT is much better than that of NT be-
cause the prescribed budget accelerates the learning pro-
cess.
Proof. The loss function during AT now be,
LAT = min
W,b
{
∑
i=1,2
1
2
[σ(Wxˆi + b)− yi]2
+
1
2
[σ(Wxˆiadv + b)− yi]2
+λ||W||2 + λ||b||2 } . (19)
 η
(W1 ≈ 6.100,η=1)
(W1 ≈ 6.447,η=0)
W1
(W1 ≥ 10
4，
η≈0.9992)
Figure 9. The value of η and W1 that satisfies Equation (23) with
λ = 10−5.
We have the first derivative of loss function as,
∂LAT
∂b
= [σ(W1(−1) + b)− 0]σ′(W1(−1) + b)
+ [σ(W1(η − 1) + b)− 0]σ′(W1(η − 1) + b)
+ [σ(W1(1) + b)− 1]σ′(W1(1) + b)
+ [σ(W1(1− η) + b)− 1]σ′(W1(1− η) + b)
+ λsign(b) = 0 (20)
∂LAT
∂W1
= [σ(W1(−1) + b)− 0]σ′(W1(−1) + b)(−1)
+ [σ(W1(η − 1) + b)− 0]
σ′(W1(η − 1) + b)(η − 1)
+ [σ(W1(1) + b)− 1]σ′(W1(1) + b)(1)
+ [σ(W1(1− η) + b)− 1]
σ′(W1(1− η) + b)(1− η)
+ λsign(W1) = 0 (21)
∂LAT
∂Wi
= λsign(Wi), i ≥ 2. (22)
Simultaneous these equations, obviously Wi = 0(i ≥ 2),
and b = 0 is the solution of the equations. Thus, restricted
AT can lead the model to the one with the best robust-
ness (best decision boundary).
Due to η ∈ [0, 2], it is easy to know that there is similar
perfect classifier with NT, the only different is that W1 has
a slight movement. W1 satisfy,
∂LAT
∂W1
= −2(1− σ(W1))2σ(W1)
− 2(1− η)(1− σ((1− η)W1))2σ((1− η)W1)
+ λsign(W1) = 0 (23)
It can be found from the solution of the equation, the
convergenceW1 rapid growth with η increases from 0; until
η ≈ 0.9992 (approach but slightly less than 1), W1 reach its
maximum; after that W1 rapid fall down, and when η = 1,
W1 ≈ 6.100 which less than W1 ≈ 6.447 when η = 0, as
shown in Figure 9. Thus, there exists a prescribed budget
(lead the AEs tending towards the decision boundary)
that makes the output model with the largest W1 and
best confidence (logit output as close as possible to the
real label).
Bring in σ′′(x) = σ′(x)σ(−x)−σ(x)σ′(x) = σ′(x)(1−
2σ(x)). At the minimum point of loss when first derivative
be zero, the second derivative of the loss function as fol-
lows,
∂2LAT
(∂b)2
= σ′(W1 − b)[1− σ(W1 − b)]
[3σ(W1 − b)− 1]
+ σ′(W1 + b)[1− σ(W1 + b)]
[3σ(W1 + b)− 1]
+ σ′((1− η)W1 − b)[1− σ((1− η)W1 − b)]
[3σ((1− η)W1 − b)− 1]
+ σ′((1− η)W1 + b)[1− σ((1− η)W1 + b)]
[3σ((1− η)W1 + b)− 1] (24)
∂2LAT
∂b∂W1
= −σ′(W1 − b)[1− σ(W1 − b)]
[3σ(W1 − b)− 1]
+ σ′(W1 + b)[1− σ(W1 + b)]
[3σ(W1 + b)− 1]
+ σ′((1− η)W1 − b)[1− σ((1− η)W1 − b)]
[3σ((1− η)W1 − b)− 1](η − 1)
+ σ′((1− η)W1 + b)[1− σ((1− η)W1 + b)]
[3σ((1− η)W1 + b)− 1](1− η) (25)
∂2LAT
(∂W1)2
= σ′(W1 − b)[1− σ(W1 − b)]
[3σ(W1 − b)− 1]
+ σ′(W1 + b)[1− σ(W1 + b)]
[3σ(W1 + b)− 1]
+ σ′((1− η)W1 − b)[1− σ((1− η)W1 − b)]
[3σ((1− η)W1 − b)− 1](1− η)2
+ σ′((1− η)W1 + b)[1− σ((1− η)W1 + b)]
[3σ((1− η)W1 + b)− 1](1− η)2. (26)
The relationship between the second derivative can be
summarized as follows. For all η, ∂
2LAT
(∂b)2 >
∂2LNT
(∂b)2 > 0,
and exist a maximum point around η ≤ 1 as in Figure 10.
For η < 1, b = 0 and W1 > 0, it is similar to know that
η
Figure 10. The properties of the curve ∂
2LAT
(∂b)2
under best W1, b =
0 with the change of η.
∂2LAT
(∂W1)2
> ∂
2LNT
(∂W1)2
> 0, with maximum point very close to
1. But when η ≈ 1, factor 1− η bring the second derivative
∂2LAT
(∂W1)2
diminish, roughly equal to that of NT.
Thus, there exists a prescribed budget (lead the AEs
tending towards the decision boundary) that accelerates
the learning process (with larger second derivative of
loss function on global minimum).
D.4. Unrestricted Adversarial Training
Lemma 3. Gradient based unconstrained AEs generating
methods generate the AEs along xˆ1 axis. Written as,
xˆ1adv = (1− η1)xˆ1 = (−1 + η1, 0ˆ)T, (27)
xˆ2adv = (1− η2)xˆ2 = (1− η2, 0ˆ)T, (28)
where ηi ∈ [0, 2], i = 1, 2, is the adversarial perturbation,
and satisfy η1 + η2 = 2, as AEs strictly on the current deci-
sion boundary.
Proof. For unrestricted AT, the optimizing objectives of
AEs is to fool the network, with AEs beyond the current
decision boundary. Because the current decision boundary
usually do not equal to perfect decision boundary, the ad-
versarial perturbation of xˆ1 and xˆ2 may not equal. Assume
the AEs strictly on the current decision boundary, thus the
adversarial perturbation satisfy η1 + η2 = 2.
Proposition 2. For classifying two points x1,x2 with a 1-
layer perceptron model, unrestricted AT can not lead the
model to the one with the best robustness.
Proof. Similar as restricted AT, by minimize the loss func-
tion, we have,
∂L
∂b
= [σ(W1(−1) + b)− 0]σ′(W1(−1) + b)
+ [σ(W1(−1 + η1) + b)− 0]σ′(W1(−1 + η1) + b)
+ [σ(W1(1) + b)− 1]σ′(W1(1) + b)
+ [σ(W1(1− η2) + b)− 1]σ′(W1(1− η2) + b)
+ λsign(b) = 0 (29)
∂L
∂W1
= [σ(W1(−1) + b)− 0]− σ′(W1(−1) + b)
+ [σ(W1(η1 − 1) + b)− 0]
σ′(W1(η1 − 1) + b)(η1 − 1)
+ [σ(W1(1) + b)− 1]σ′(W1(1) + b)(1)
+ [σ(W1(1− η2) + b)− 1]
σ′(W1(1− η2) + b)(1− η2)
+ λsign(W1) = 0 (30)
∂L
∂Wi
= λsign(Wi), i ≥ 2. (31)
Bring in η1 − 1 = 1− η2,
∂L
∂b
= [σ(b−W1)]σ′(b−W1)
+ [σ(W1 + b)− 1]σ′(W1 + b)
+ [2σ(W1(1− η2) + b)− 1]
σ′(W1(1− η2) + b)
+ λsign(b) = 0 (32)
∂L
∂W1
= [σ(b−W1)− 0]σ′(b−W1)(−1)
+ [σ(W1 + b)− 1]σ′(W1 + b)
+ [2σ(W1(1− η2) + b)− 1]
σ′(W1(1− η2) + b)(1− η2)
+ λsign(W1) = 0 (33)
∂L
∂Wi
= λsign(Wi), i ≥ 2. (34)
The second derivative of ∂
2LAT
(∂b)2 of unrestricted AT as fol-
lows,
∂2LAT
(∂b)2
= σ′(W1 − b)[1− σ(W1 − b)]
[3σ(W1 − b)− 1]
+ σ′(W1 + b)[1− σ(W1 + b)]
[3σ(W1 + b)− 1]
+ σ′((1− η1)W1 − b)[1− σ((1− η1)W1 − b)]
[3σ((1− η1)W1 − b)− 1]
+ σ′((1− η2)W1 + b)[1− σ((1− η2)W1 + b)]
[3σ((1− η2)W1 + b)− 1]. (35)
Decision boundary(-b/W1)
η
2
η2
(η2=1.5)
(η2=1)
Figure 11. (Upper) The decision boundary varying with η2 with
W1 = 5 and η1 = 0.5. (Lower) ∂L∂b with varying η2 withW1 = 5,
b = 2.5 and η1 = 0.5.
If η1 − 1 = 1 − η2 = − bW1 , on the current decision
boundary, the “1− η2”(AEs) term come to zero, then
∂L
∂b
= [σ(b−W1)]σ′(b−W1)
+ [σ(W1 + b)− 1]σ′(W1 + b)
+ λsign(b) = 0 (36)
∂L
∂W1
= [σ(b−W1)− 0]σ′(b−W1)(−1)
+ [σ(W1 + b)− 1]σ′(W1 + b)
+ λsign(W1) = 0 (37)
∂L
∂Wi
= λsign(Wi), i ≥ 2. (38)
Although the loss function has same minimize as NT, but
the “1 − η2”(AEs) term in the gradient equal to 0, the gra-
dient is almost half of which of NT. Thus, unrestricted AT
can not ensure better result than NT.
Otherwise during unrestricted AT, there must exist a state
that b 6= 0 (not convergence to its best). In order to ana-
lyze the effects of AEs crossing the decision boundary, we
test different η2 as in Figure 11(Upper) & (Lower), dif-
ferent η2 may lead different converge decision boundary
with different ∂L∂b . By fixing η1, the convergence limit of
b changes with parameters η2. Due to assume the current
decision boundary located at −0.5, AEs in unrestricted AT
with η2 = 1.5 lead ∂L∂b very close to 0, almost impossible
to improve the decision boundary effectively. Smaller η2
can produce more improvement until η2 = 0.5, achieve re-
stricted AT. ∂L∂b reach its maximum when η2 = 0. If η2 ≤ 1,
∂L
∂b almost reach its maximum. This means unrestricted AT
still has much room for improvement. Thus, the “1 − η2”
term will influence the results and deviating the model
to the one with the best robustness.
D.5. Blind Adversarial Training
Proposition 3. For classifying two points x1,x2 with a 1-
layer perceptron model, BAT also can lead the model to the
one with the best robustness, and has the same convergence
property as restricted AT with best budget.
Proof. The proposed BAT can achieve such a good results,
due to the cutoff-scale strategy therein.
Cutoff: Cutoff using average norm of AEs as the bud-
get, to prevent AEs beyond the perfect decision boundary.
In numerical calculation, it is impossible to exact know the
perfect decision boundary, but the average of AEs, to some
extent, reflects the nature and give a path to potential guess
of perfect decision boundary.
As in this perceptron model in Figure 11 (Lower), AEs
be on the current decision boundary η2 = 1.5, lead ∂L∂b ∼ 0,
make the unrestricted AT worse. But when η2 < 1, ∂L∂b
reach maximum, the model updated quickly. Cutoff used
the average of AEs satisfy ε = η1+η22 = 1, equivalent to
reset the budget to η1 = 0.5, η2 = 1, can enlarge the ∂L∂b and
lead the model converge faster as in Figure 11. Thus, cutoff
can make BAT algorithm achieving the similar effect as
restricted AT without using prescribed budget.
Scale: As in Figure 10, the maximum second derivative
of loss function appears at a little distance from the decision
boundary, scale can lead the AEs from the decision bound-
ary to such position. Meanwhile, most unconstrained AEs
may produce AEs beyond the current decision boundary,
scale can pull these AEs back into the decision boundary,
make the algorithm convergence faster. Thus, scale can
make BAT algorithm achieving the similar effect as re-
stricted AT with best budget.
Convergence property: Once we obtain the ideal
model (the decision boundary is actually the centerline of
the data with different labels) and optimal DeepFool AEs
(just slightly beyond the decision boundary), E||δ(x)|| can
represent the mean distance between the data and the deci-
sion boundary. Thus, the cutoff will directly cut off the AEs
with relatively large strength, while the scale will ensure
that the AEs will not extend beyond the decision boundary,
especially for the AEs with small strength. They both have
little influence on the ideal model. For example, as shown
in Figure 5 (d), the cutoff and scale will maintain the AEs
not to affect the model’s updating. Thus, it is available to
know the result of final convergence is the result of re-
stricted AT with best budget, has the same convergence
property.
So in conclusion, the proposed BAT can perform the
best facing two points x1,x2 classification problem with
a 1-layer perceptron model. We can extend this conclusion
to more general problems, and conjecture that for general
classification neural network, BAT can dynamically adjust
a nonuniform budget, seek to provide a path to potentially
guess the perfect decision boundary, and finally reach the
model with best robustness.
